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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
CONSTRUCTION

"GARAGE"

OF

STATUTES

-

MEANING

IN LICENSE TAX PROVISIONS. -

OF

TM

WORD

By its charter, granted

in 1921 by the legislature of West Virginia, the city of Bluefield
was given the power to levy license taxes on certain things not
licensed by the state, including "automobile garages". Plaintiffs were the proprietors of two rooms, each 25 by 50 feet in
size, located within the city, wherein they conducted an automobile repairing business. No separate charge was made for storage
of cars kept for repair but some were housed with the express
provision that plaintiffs should service them regularly, receiving
a specified payment therefor. A sign in front of the building
read, "Short Bros., Garage". On this business the city levied a
$25 license tax, and plaintiffs sued for an injunction against its
collection, on the ground that their building, used only for repair,
was not, under the meaning of the city's charter, a garage. The
trial court granted the injunction, and the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, being evenly divided on the question (Judge
Woods was absent from the bench), affirmed the decision of the
trial court,' holding that the building was not a garage, because
not used primarily for storage for safe-keeping. Short V. City of
Bluefield?
The meaning of the word "garage", upon which this litigation turns, has frequently been considered by various courts,' but
usually in cases involving statutory definitions' or other distinguishing features. Apparently the most analogous situation
was that which confronted a Mississippi court in an action to
recover a privilege tax on an automobile repair shop, paid under
protest. There, also, the shop was one in which automobiles were
stored without charge, but with the expectation of doing the repair work. The Mississippi court, briefly noting the usual character of present-day garages and the fact that they almost invariably include both storage rooms and repair shops, concluded
'BLACK,
THE LAw oF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS, 76-80. A divided court affirms, as between the parties, a decision before it on appeal, but in only
Two jurisdictions (South Carolina and the House of Lords), is such an
affirmance regarded as a precedent.
2160 S. E. 562 (W. Va. 1931).
'DEC.

DIG., AUT0OBrLES, key no. 364.

'The statute involved in State v. Elkins, 187 N. C. 532, 122 S. E. 289
(1921), a widely cited case, defines a garage as "any place where automobiles are repaired or stored, and for which a charge is made".
5Lawrence v. Middleton, 103 Miss. 173, 60 So. 130 (1912).
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that the legislature meant the license tax provision in question to
cover both, singly or in combination, and so held the repair shop
a public garage and the operator thereof liable for the license
tax.
While the West Virginia decision, rendered by an evenly
divided court, is not a precedent in West Virginia,' as to the
exact point involved, the case is of added interest because of the
method of interpretation employed in construing the statute. The
court chose for its interpretation of the word "garage" a definition set out in a number of dictionaries and in the holdings of
certain "authorities", those holdings being, in most instances,
verbatum repetitions of the dictionary definition.' As the meaning which the charter's framers meant the word to have is the
one to be ascertained,' this method of interpretation presumes
that the legislators meant to indicate a purely "dictionary"
meaning. There is, admittedly, a possibility that they did, and
the decision is certainly not without authority," but the "dictionary" presumption is not so conclusive as to preclude a feeling
that this decision, as well as many other similar holdings, may be
unsound.
Automobiles and automobile businesses are of comparatively
recent introduction, but are now of such legal importance that
they comprise a separate topic of the law. Prominent among the
mass of new terminology covering that topic is the word "garage".
Recently adopted into English from the French language, with,
naturally, its native meaning, (and it is that meaning which
practically all dictionaries set out)," this word has grown in
popular concept until it is generally inclusive of many kindred
automobile businesses, such as storage depots, sales rooms and
repair shops, which are usually incorporated into the modern
"garage".'
This concept of the word is sufficiently popular in
use to warrant its consideration, in the statute's interpretation,
under abundant authority from many jurisdictions." A presumption that the legislators so meant to use the word is, if anything,
'W. Va. Const., art. 8, § 4.

' It is noteworthy that the opinion was written by a dissenting judge, and

that the material and references incorporated in it give as much support
to the "minority" as to the "majority" view.
'Altmeyer v. Caulfield, 37 W. Va. 847, 17 S. E. 404 (1893); Click v.
Click, 98 W. Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925).
' Note (1929) 61 A. L. R. 312.
10Ibi.
n Lawrence v. Middleton, supra n.5.
"De Ganay v. Lederer, 250 U. S. 376, 39 S. Ct. 524 (1919); Wellman v.
Bethea, 243 Fed. 222 (D. C. S. C. 1917); U. S. v. Graham, 250 Fed. 499 (D.
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stronger than the presumption that they were guided by a dictionary.'
The court's method of interpretation might be justified, from
a practical standpoint, if its result were sufficiently desirable.
However, it does not seem that large repair shops used only
secondarily for storage, should be granted exemptions, and license
tax levies made on small storage buildings, rented indiscriminately
to the public. It appears that such would be the result of the
"dictionary-minded"
distinction drawn by the West Virginia
court.
-- JAcK C. BURDETT.

EVIDENCE

-

ADMISSIBILITY OF AN ATEoEmT's DYING DECAIARA-

TION. - In a murder prosecution, a question arose as to the admissibility of the dying declaration of an atheist.
The dying
declarant did not believe in any Supreme Being, or in any future
existence beyond death. He did not possess a belief in any form
of divine punishment or reward. The court relying on a statute
abolishing the requirement that a witness must testify under oath,
held the declaration admissible. Wtight v. Stae.1
The common law admitted dying declarations, within certain
limits, as an exception to the hearsay rule. It required that the
dying declarant possess a belief in God, in addition to a belief
that he was to die very soon. The courts felt that the gravity of
death under such circumstances was equal to the solemnity of an
oath in court as a guaranty of trustworthiness.
In the principal case the court recognized the common law
rule, but held that it was abrogated by the statute making an
atheist competent to testify.

It is clear that the statute cited by the court removed the
bar of atheism from the declarant's testimony and made him fully

competent to be a witness. There still remains, however, the problem of determining whether the dying declaration is sufficiently
C. Va. 1917); Wilkinson v. Mutual Saving Ass'n., 13 F. (2d) 997 (C. C. A.
7th 1926); Balanced, etc., Attractions v. Town of Manitou, 38 F. (2d) 28
(C. C. A. 10th 1930); Perrin v. Miller, 35 Cal. App. 129, 69 Pac. 426 (1917);
People v. Muldoon, 306 Ill. 234, 137 N. E. 863 (1922); Bohannon v. City
of Louisville, 193 Ky. 276, 235 S. W. 750 (1921); West v. Lysle, 302 Pa.
147, 153 AtL 131 (1931); Scott v. Doughty, 124 Va. 358, 97 S. E. 802 (1919);
Brown v. Robinson, 175 N. E. 269 (Mass. 1931).
2People v. Elliff, 74 Colo. 81, 219 Pac. 224 (1923).
1135 So. 636 (Ala. 1931).
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